In many ways that pertain solely to the war in Ukraine, the G7 leaders are more aligned and steadfast than ever. But on uncertain questions about the future of the international order, and China’s intentions and role within it, their very different priorities keep them as divided as ever.
The 49th G7 summit was held in the Japanese city of Hiroshima, separated from the contested Taiwan strait only by a few hundred miles of East China Sea. There, while promising the largest package of support for Ukraine since the war began, the G7 used China’s close relationship with Russia as the focal point for a series of ‘united’ statements against the threat China’s potential economic and military expansion poses to the worlds U.S. dominated security and trade relationships.
This China focussed section of the summit’s communique is prefaced with the usual ‘de-risking not de-coupling’ preamble: “we stand prepared to build constructive and stable relations with China… our policy approaches are not designed to harm China nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development.” Yet swiftly the document tacks to calling the PRC out on a number of hot button issues, including atrocities in Xinjiang, their ‘non-market policies and practices’ in world trade, and their aggressive military behaviour in the South China Sea. Finally the 7 leaders call on China, to press Russia to ‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine.’
On the surface, these resolutions seem to confirm what U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters before the summit: “You can expect to hear at the end of those discussions that all the G7 leaders are of a common mind about how to deal with the challenges that the PRC presents.” However, the diplomatic lines of the communique only thinly veil deeply held disagreements between G7 leaders on their approach to China.
Two recent visits to Beijing from French President Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, reveal the fault lines that exist between those in Europe who want to ‘persuade Xi away from Russia’ and those wedded to the US and Tokyo in their more existential, hardened stance on China’s rise. In the cases of France and Germany in particular, their positions have deep roots that are inseparable from the economic history and geo-political space these nations occupy in the world.
Indeed, it has been less than a month since Macron cause uproar in the international community, by insisting NATO should focus primarily on the ‘Euro-Atlantic theatre,’ and that ‘Taiwan was not Europe’s fight.’ So as much as they say they are moving forward together, the G7’s underlying divisions and conflicting interests continue to threaten American prospects for a truly cohesive approach to China, that stops the PRC further augmenting the international order the U.S. have dominated for so long.
Britain and China 